Read the full
hard hitting and shocking report here.
RAF
If
the IPT had done its job properly, there was a good
prospect that Hazard H73 would have been
properly assessed and addressed, and XV230 would not
have been lost.
The
following three key personnel within the IPT bear substantial
responsibility for the failure of
the NSC to capture the risk which led to the loss of
XV230 and are open to significant criticism:
Group Captain (now Air Commodore) George Baber (IPT
Leader).
Wing Commander Michael Eagles (Head of Air Vehicle).
Frank Walsh (Safety Manager).
BAE Systems
If
the Nimrod Safety Case had been prepared with proper
skill, care and attention, the catastrophic
fire risk to the Nimrod MR2 fleet represented by the
Cross-Feed/Supplementary Conditioning Pack
duct and Air-to-Air refuelling would have been spotted
and XV230 would not have been lost.
The
following key BAE Systems management personnel involved
in the Nimrod Safety Case in
2001-2005 bear primary responsibility for the above
matters:
Chris Lowe (Chief Airworthiness Engineer).
Richard Oldfield (Task Leader).
Eric Prince (Flight Systems and Avionics Manager).
The
regrettable conduct of some of BAE Systems managers
suggests that BAE Systems has failed
to implement an adequate or effective culture, committed
to safety and ethical conduct. The
responsibility for this must lie with the leadership
of the Company.
QinetiQ
QinetiQ’s
approach was fundamentally lax and compliant. QinetiQ
failed at any stage to act as
the independent ‘conscience’ of the IPT. As
a result, the ‘third stool’ in the safety
process, namely
independent assurance, was effectively missing from
the Nimrod Safety Case process.
The
following personnel bear primary responsibility for
QinetiQ’s failures:
Martyn Mahy (Task Manager)
Colin Blagrove (Technical Assurance Manager)
